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"We're the... United States. Do we need Africa?"'
1. INTRODUCTION
The nations of the sub-Saharan portion of the African continent
have recently attracted the attention of U.S. policymakers. The U.S.
House of Representatives and Senate held a series of hearings on
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1 Barton Gellman, World Shunned Signs of the Coming Plague, WASH. POST, July
5, 2000, at Al (quoting Dr. Jonathan Mann, Project SIDA Director, before his res-
ignation from the World Health Organization in 1990 because of a perceived lack
of commitment to control AIDS in Africa).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
trade relations with Africa in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999.2 In 1997,
President Clinton announced a number of initiatives-in educa-
tion, agriculture, security, environment, labor, finance, human
rights, trade, and development-to support economic growth and
opportunity in Africa.3 These initiatives were launched in 1998
when the President made a much-publicized journey to a number
of sub-Saharan nations.4 This action signaled an agenda designed
to heighten awareness of a void in U.S. -Africa relations. In the
fall of 1999, Congress approved a portion of debt relief for Africa as
part of an agreement reached by the G-7 industrialized nations
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the
United States) and Russia (the aggregate known as the G-8 nations)
during the previous summer.5 This action also accorded with the
World Bank's advocacy of broad debt relief to the poorest coun-
tries, many of which are located in Africa.6 In February 2000, the
Clinton administration participated in a National Summit on Af-
rica convened in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the Ford
Foundation.7 The summit aimed to highlight mutual benefits of-
fered by expanded association between constituents of the United
2 See U.S. Trade Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999); Africa's Emerging
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the Comm. on Int'l Relations,
105th Cong. (1997); Obstacles to U.S.-African Trade and Investment: Joint Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Africa and Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Int'l Rela-
tions, 105th Cong. (1997); U.S. Trade With Sub-Saharan Africa: Hearing Before Sub-
comm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. (1996); Trade and
Investment in Africa: Hearing Before African Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. (1995).
3 THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES: BUILDING THE U.S.-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP: HAND-
IN-HAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (1999).
4 See Martha M. Hamilton & Lynne Duke, Africa's Potential as Trade Partner
Attracts Corporate Interest, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1998, at A14 (writing about Presi-
dent Clinton's eleven-day trip to Africa to encourage Africa's emergence in the
global economy); Ann Scales, Clinton's Africa Tour is Called a Success, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1998, at D8 (observing the opinion of some that President Clinton's
African visit helped to elevate the continent of Africa).
5 Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 1095,106th Cong. (1999)
(enacted).
6 See IMF Adopts Debt Relief, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 27, 1999, at 1A; WORLD
BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 250 box 8.4 (2000) (discussing the
World Bank and IMF plan to expand the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initia-
tive).
7 Steven Mufson, President Says U.S. Has Stake in Africa's Success, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 2000, at A17.
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States and sub-Saharan nations of Africa. Increased trade oppor-
tunities are chief among the expected advantages.8
In May 2000, President Clinton signed the Trade and Develop-
ment Act of 2000.9 The Act established the United States-sub-
Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum, liberal-
ized import restrictions, and relaxed tariffs on textiles imported
into the United States. Enactment of that measure culminated
years of efforts by Congressman Charles Rangel and others to
highlight the need for development of enhanced commercial ties
with sub-Saharan Africa. In previous years, Congressman Rangel
had introduced a bill to improve trade relations with Africa. 0 In
August 2000, President Clinton journeyed again to sub-Saharan
Africa on a peace-keeping mission."
The January 2001 change in administration in Washington,
D.C. may not signal the end of engagement with Africa. There are
indications that the administration of President George W. Bush
holds some humanitarian interest in the fate of Africa.' 2 In May
2001, Secretary of State Cohn Powell made a high-profile visit to
sub-Saharan African nations on a mission to explore economic, so-
cial, political, and security issues.13 In addition, participation in the
U.S.-sub-Saharan Africa trade summit in October 2001, in Wash-
ington, D.C., signaled the Bush administration's interest in eco-
nomic development in sub-Saharan Africa.
14
8 Id.
9 Trade and Development Act of 2000, H.R. 434,106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
10 African Growth and Opportunity Act, H.R. 1432,105th Cong. (1998).
11 See Ellen Nakashima, Clinton Encourages Nigerian Democracy: Former Pariah
Called 'Pivot Point'for Africa, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2000, at A22 (monitoring Presi-
dent Clinton's visit to Nigeria in order to encourage its transition to democracy).
12 See Mary McGrory, Suddenly, Sudan, WASH. Posr, Mar. 11, 2001, at B1
(noting that President George W. Bush "virtually wrote off Africa" during a cam-
paign debate, but that he expressed concern about people in the Sudan during an
aircraft carrier dedication, and also noting the concerns of Secretary of State Colin
Powell and a number of conservative Republican congressmen about human
rights abuses and religious persecution in the Sudan).
13 See Marc Lacey, At End of Africa Trip, Powell Urges Sudan to Halt Civil War,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2001, at A2 (concluding that Secretary of State Colin Powell's
four-country visit to Africa brought him in contact with Africa's numerous prob-
lems and promises).
14 See Paul H. O'Neill, The Best Investment in Helping Poor Nations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2001, at A19 (reporting suggestion by the Secretary of the Treasury that
productivity in the poorest developing countries may be alleviated by investment
in human capital in that region--education, health, nutrition, sanitation-and
capital investments to foster productivity in viable and competitive markets);
20021
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In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, in which
criminals linked to Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist
network launched an attack on the United States, the United States'
interest in a stable sub-Saharan Africa heightened.15 Awareness of
potential gains from broader ties to sub-Saharan Africa affords im-
petus to consider the impact of U.S. tax policy on investment in
these countries. Given the differing views expressed by policy-
makers engaged in the current debate about the future of the inter-
national taxation system, it is opportune to interject a dialectic
demonstrating that long-term interests of the United States, the
leader of the new economy, are served if sub-Saharan Africa be-
comes an acknowledged player. Without radical reconsideration
of some of the premises supporting the current U.S. tax regime, Af-
rica's role as a treaty partner will remain negligible and it will con-
tinue to be a site of last resort for investment by U.S. businesses.
This Article proposes that the United States reverse a historic bias
and adopt a network of treaties with sub-Saharan Africa that pro-
vide an exemption from U.S. tax for specified income from African
sources. The proposal does not call for wholesale implementation
of an exemption system, but rather calls for a limited plan for Afri-
can-source income only, which is designed to provide a platform
for increased investment in sub-Saharan Africa by U.S. firms.
2. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST USE OF AN EXEMPION
SYSTEM TO INCREASE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA
Just as the case for invigorating trade and other relations with
Africa may not be readily apparent to some, the case for revising
those features of the U.S. tax system that disfavor investment in the
sub-Saharan world is not intuitive. Although European countries,
Mexico, Canada, Japan, and some developing nations, such as
President Announces October Summit to Develop African Trade, JET, June 4, 2001, at 6
(reporting on the meeting of representatives from thirty-five sub-Saharan African
nations in Washington to discuss ways in which the United States can stimulate
trade in the area). See generally NATIONAL SUMMIT ON AFRICA, THE NATIONAL
POLICY PLAN OF ACTION FOR U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE 21sr CENTURY (2000)
(detailing recommendations adopted at the summit to help guide the relationship
between the United States and Africa).
15 William Jefferson Clinton, Shaping the Future; America's Role in a Challenging
World, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2002, at C1 (noting that approximately fifty million chil-
dren in sub-Saharan Africa never go to school and stating that the United States
should help fund education as a means of reducing the pool of potential terror-
ists).
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China, India, and Venezuela, have commanded partnerships with
the United States, African nations have not. A continent of vast
natural resources and a considerable labor force, Africa is none-
theless "one of the last regions ... to enter the global economy."
16
The African continent contains a total population of about 778
million. Sub-Saharan Africa includes two-thirds of that total, or
642.8 million, among forty-four countries.17 To date, the situation
of much of Africa in the new economy has been that of aid recipi-
ent, region of civil and inter-nation strife, location of catastrophic
natural disasters, scene of devastating illness, and situs of relent-
less poverty and shortened life expectancy. Implicit in President
Clinton's campaign to eliminate debt of some of the poorest Afri-
can nations was an acknowledgment of the critical needs of a
population for which annual per capita gross national product
("GNP") ranges from $110 to $4,120.18 Although the debt relief
initiative seems well-intentioned, it may have minimal positive
impact on the lives of residents of sub-Saharan Africa. Actual pro-
vision of relief has been tied to enumerated improvements in infra-
structure, including education, health care, transportation, and
economic reforms, which fewer than a handful of nations may
achieve in the foreseeable future. For instance, only five nations
have qualified for the debt relief promised by the June 1999 World
Bank initiative.19 Moreover, there is heated debate about the merits
of structural improvements sponsored by the World Bank.20
16 Robert Mallett, Keynote Address, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569,570 (1999).
17 The countries comprising sub-Saharan Africa are: Angola, Benin, Bot-
swana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Republic of Zaire),
Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nige-
ria, Rwanda, Sao Tomb and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
18 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, U.S.-AFRIcA TRADE FLOWS AND EFFEcrs OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS AND U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT PoLIcY, 1-4-1-16
tbl. 1-1 (1999). Per capita GNP was $110 in 1998 for the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Ethiopia; per capita GNP was $4,120 in 1998 for Gabon. Id.
19 The eligible nations are Burkina Faso, C6te d'Ivoire, Mali, Mozambique,
and Uganda. Id. at 3-13.
20 See Norimitsu Onishi, In the Oil-Rich Nigeria Delta, Deep Poverty and Grim
Fires, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 11, 2000, at Al (discussing World Bank financing of oil
pipelines in Africa); see also Marc Lacey, Traditional Spirits Block a $500 Million Dam
Plan in Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at B1 (noting cultural obstacles to in-
vestments in Africa).
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Aid from the industrialized world in the form of grants and
loans seems an unsatisfactory solution to the lag in growth and de-
velopment currently observed in Africa. As the U.S. example
demonstrates, the level of aid provided may be affected by political
agendas. In 1998, U.S. aid to the poorest developing countries
amounted to 0.1% of the gross national product (about four dollars
in taxes for each taxpaying American).2' From 1995 to 1997, annual
U.S. foreign aid to Africa declined from $1.3 to $1.1 billion.22 That
decline has been attributed to increased demand for domestic so-
cial spending during that period and a perception by some in Con-
gress that the United States lacks "strategic interests" in Africa.23
Even in a climate of renewed interest in Africa, documented by the
initiatives of the administration of President Clinton described
above, support for aid in the form of debt relief may be diminished
by other policy goals. In the fall of 1999, Congress authorized only
a small portion of the debt relief sought by President Clinton in ful-
fillment of the G-8 pact.24 It was widely reported that the Clinton
administration acquiesced in provision of only partial relief in or-
der to maximize the possibility of success for the China Trade Bill,
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in May 2000 and the
U.S. Senate in September 2000.25
Aid for the purpose of helping the African continent battle the
devastation of AIDS, proposed by the Clinton Administration
through loans by the Export-Import Bank, is also a welcome strat-
egy to support the health of Africa's citizenry.26 Only the future
21 See Brett Parris, A Better World for Some?, OECD OBSERVER, Oct. 2000, at 40.
The percentage of GNP devoted to developing country assistance falls far short of
the 0.7% to which the United States and other industrialized nation-members of
the United Nations agreed. Id. at 40-41.
22 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 790
(2000).
23 Peter J. Schraeder, African International Relations, in UNDERSTANDING
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 151 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 1996).
24 Debt Relief and Development in Africa Act of 1999, H.R. 2232,106th Cong.
(1999) (enacted).
25 An Act to Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal
Trade Relations Treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to Establish a
Framework for Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of
China, H.R. 4444,106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
26 See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Offers Africa $1 Billion a Year for Fighting AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2001, at Al. The U.S. agreement to provide loans of up to $1 billion
a year falls far short of the mark established by the United Nations, which re-
quested contributions of up to $10 billion per year to its AIDS fund.
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can confirm whether the provision of loans by the United States, as
well as other leading industrial nations, to help impoverished na-
tions battle such a fundamental threat to survival is an appropriate
form of assistance. Indeed, agreement by developed-world phar-
maceutical companies to provide vital medicines to African people
at an affordable cost coupled with a program of grants to enable
purchase appears to be a more effective solution to the current
health crises on that continent.27
Despite the recent aid and trade initiatives by the industrialized
world in favor of Africa, it is apparent that for various reasons-
among them political controversy, perceived incompatibility of in-
terests, and even racism 28-these hold limited power to produce
and sustain real change. This Article contends that a solution in
the form of tax relief for specified investments may afford the
greatest promise. This initiative and the potential obstacles to im-
plementation are discussed below.
This Article proposes what some may view as a radical revision
of the U.S. system of taxation of foreign source income. In par-
ticular, it advocates a shift to an exemption system in which in-
come derived from investment in sub-Saharan nations is free of
27 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. At Odds With Europe Over Rules on World Drug
Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A8 (discussing the debate over the pricing of
drugs for the treatment of AIDS). Reporter Jeffrey Sachs comments:
When medical interventions in the United States are judged for their
'cost-effectiveness,' the usual standard is to accept a technology if it
saves American lives at a cost of $50,000 to $100,000 a person each year.
Europeans, for their part, have just decided to spend around $5 billion
this year to fight mad cow disease, which has claimed around 80 lives.
About 17 million Africans have already died of AIDS, and the millions
more who are sick could be saved with drugs costing just $500 a year to
produce. One maker of generic drugs, Cipla of India, said... it would
provide the drugs to Africa at $350 to $600 a year .... Until very re-
cently, the American and European pharmaceutical companies that hold
the patents on the AIDS drugs were asking $10,000 or more for one per-
son s annual supply, but now they are ready to provide them at little
more than cost, meeting the competition of generics producers as long as
the patent rights are respected ....
Jeffrey Sachs, The Best Possible Investment in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at
A27.
28 Karen DeYoung, Those Who Need Foreign Aid the Most Are Seeing It Go Else-
where, WASH. Posr, Nov. 25, 1999, at Al (contrasting the massive outpouring of
aid in response to the return of Kosovo Albanians, approximately $1.50 per day
per refugee, with aid to victims of conflicts in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, $0.11 per
day per refugee, and noting implied or outright charges of racism by representa-
tives of African nations before the U.N. Security Council).
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U.S. income taxation. This experimental regime would expire at
the end of a ten- or fifteen-year period. That period would begin
on the effective date of an income tax treaty between the United
States and the African nation. If review of progress under the pro-
posed regime confirmed a measure of success towards achieving
targets, extension of the legislation would be recommended. The
goals of the program are to increase the amount of U.S. investment
in sub-Saharan Africa and to hold revenue loss to an acceptable
level.
In addition to provisions governing the tax rate to be imposed
by the African nation on specified income from U.S. operations in
that region, the treaty would contain safeguards designed to deter
U.S. taxpayers from abusing the resources of the affected African
nations. These would include: (1) specification of the type of for-
eign source income eligible for U.S. tax relief (from activities relat-
ing to manufacturing, technology, natural resource exploration, or
research and development, for example); (2) exchange of informa-
tion and other information sharing arrangements permitting all
parties to monitor investment activity; and (3) sovereignty-
preserving provisions detailing minimum standards relating to in-
vestment activity required by the African nation in areas such as
natural resource protection, infrastructure development (trans-
portation, public utilities, etc.), and labor practices (including
minimum compensation provisions). While a multilateral treaty is
preferable, involving a negotiation en bloc between interested Afri-
can nations and the United States, bilateral treaties between a sin-
gle nation and the United States would also be encouraged.
Potential challenges to implementation of this proposal are
numerous. Adoption of an exemption from tax for income from
specified investments would counter the reigning mantra of the
U.S. international tax regime, known as "capital export neutral-
ity."29 In systems based upon the capital export neutrality princi-
ple, like that of the United States in large part, preservation of pro-
duction efficiency is a prominent goal.30 Production efficiency
theoretically results in allocation of capital to activities providing
29 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANsAcTIONS
17 (1997) ("Capital-export neutrality is achieved when a U.S. investor pays the
same total rate of U.S. and foreign tax on foreign-source income before tax as the
rate of U.S. tax it pays on U.S.-source income before tax.").
30 JOEL SLEMROD, FREE TRADE TAXATION AND PROTECrIONIST TAXATION 6 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4902,1994).
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the highest rate of return regardless of tax rate. The U.S. system
implements this goal by taxing worldwide income of its multina-
tional businesses (firms incorporated in the United States and do-
ing business in domestic and foreign markets) under one rate
structure and providing a credit against U.S. tax liability for for-
eign taxes paid.3' It removes a possible incentive to shift capital to
lower-taxing jurisdictions where rates of return may be lower. The
exemption system proposed in this Article directly challenges the
capital export neutrality principle because it could provide an in-
centive to initiate investment in an African country if the tax rate
were lower than that prevailing in the United States.
Although the production efficiency paradigm has gained hold
in international tax policy discourse, it does not provide a persua-
sive case for rejecting the exemption system proposed in this Arti-
cle. For good reasons, the U.S. tax system has in targeted areas
ceded its claim on worldwide income of its multinational firms.32
These provisions purport to promote competitiveness of domestic
companies and offer incentives for export businesses.33 The pres-
ent regime also features prominent loopholes that permit U.S.
companies to fashion foreign operations without regard for pro-
duction efficiency in a manner resulting in moderation of U.S. tax
rates on worldwide income.34 The current economic and social cri-
ses in sub-Saharan Africa, indicating a critical need for commercial
partnerships with the industrialized world, suggest that modifica-
tion of U.S. tax rules is essential to attract investment in that region.
Tax incentives for investments in sub-Saharan Africa would
serve a redistributive function that comports with the concept of
31 See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (affirming Congress' power to tax in-
come received by U.S. citizens for property located abroad); see also I.R.C. §§ 901,
904 (1994) (regulating taxable income).
32 See I.R.C. §§ 921-23 (1994) (excluding qualified foreign trade income); I.R.C.
§ 911 (repealed 1976) (excluding certain foreign earned income); I.R.C. §§ 941-43
(repealed 1976) (former foreign sales corporation rules); I.R.C. § 881 (1994) (regu-
lating taxation of a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. multinational com-
pany); see also Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L.
REV. 455, 468 (1999) (noting that the deferral privilege is a tax incentive not avail-
able to earnings from domestic operations).
33 See JAMEs R. HINES, JR., TAX PoLicy AND THE AcTiTIEs OF MULTINATIONAL
CoRPORATIONS 6-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5589,
1996).
34 See James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Reconsidera-
tion, 52 NAT'LTAXJ. 385, 388-90 (1999).
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equity, a fundamental principle in the domestic arena. The sub-
Saharan region of Africa seems a worthy target of concern. The
globalization of the world economy, in which the United States is a
determined player, is only strengthened by strong trade partners,
including those in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the pressure to
focus on stability in Africa after the events of September 11, 2001
furnishes additional impetus to undertake measures that will bol-
ster the economies of those countries.
The vibrancy of the U.S. economy relative to that of sub-
Saharan Africa supports action. The U.S. Census Bureau indicates
that the poverty rate in this nation has declined to the lowest level
in two decades, with median household income rising to $40,816 in
2000.35 This report suggests that this is an opportune moment to
implement efforts designed to affect destitution abroad. Notwith-
standing the recent decline of the U.S. economy since the summer
of 2001, which was exacerbated by the economic effects of the
September 11th events, there may be some ability to sustain the
revenue loss accompanying the proposed exemption system for
African investment. Moreover, any revenue loss created by the
proposed tax exemption for investment in Africa may be tempo-
rary if it leads to increases in income from other operations taxable
by the United States. 36
The proposed exemption system raises four additional con-
cerns which are addressed in detail below. First, U.S. obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") must
be considered. A World Trade Organization ("WTO") appeals
panel held that the newly enacted tax exemption for extraterritorial
income (derived from the sale and lease of exported property,
among other things) constituted an illegal export subsidy. The
preferential rules for extraterritorial income replace the former for-
eign sales corporation ("FSC") rules, which were repealed due to a
similar WTO ruling in 1999.37 This Article concludes below that
35 See D'Vera Cohn, Poverty Declines to 20-Year Low, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
2000, at A2 (relating the Census Bureau report of a decline in poverty rate to
11.8% in 2000 and historical lows in poverty rates among blacks, Hispanics, and
Asian/Pacific Islanders).
36 See William G. Gale, Peter Orszag, & Gene Sperling, The Changing Budget
Outlook: Causes and Implications, 93 TAX NOTES 1093 (2001) (attributing the decline
in the forecasted ten-year budget surplus to the spring 2001 tax cut and increased
government spending since the September 2001 terrorist attacks).
37 See Trevor Drury & Chuck Gnaedinger, European Union Requests Sanctions
Against United States in FSC Dispute, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 20, 2000, available at
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the proposal to exempt specified income from African sources
would not cause the United States to violate its international trade
obligations under the GATT.
The second concern is that a move toward an exemption sys-
tem as proposed may cause U.S. firms to move offshore in search
of lower-cost production, creating the so-called "runaway plant"
problem. Labor proponents point to the potential for loss of jobs
by American workers as the result of a shift by U.S. firms to off-
shore production.39 They have, therefore, challenged tax proposals
favoring income from foreign operations. Given the tremendous
importance of the labor sector to the social and economic health of
this nation, such critiques must be considered seriously.
This Article concludes, however, that the proposal does not
subordinate the interests of U.S. labor or create a shift of benefits
directly from U.S. to foreign workers. There is substantial evidence
that expansion of trade opportunities, under agreements like the
North American Free Trade Agreement, has created phenomena
like the maquiladora industry, in which American companies have
closed U.S. plants to move assembly to locations just across the
border in Mexico to obtain lower-cost labor. 0 These operations
have resulted in devastation of the local environment and atro-
cious abuses of workers, particularly women, who must toil under
inhumane conditions for subsistence pay. In these circumstances,
the benefits to U.S. firms in the form of zero tariff rates and a par-
LEXIS, 2000 TNT 224-1; Gregory Lubkin, FSC Replacement Update: Enacting Extra-
territorial Exclusions, 30 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 33, 33 (2001) (discussing President
Clinton's signing H.R. 4986 into law as a response to the WTO ruling); Chuck
Gnaedinger & Robert Goulder, WTO Finds Successor to FSC Regime Also Violates
Trade Rules, 92 TAx NOTES 15, 15-16 (2001); Punitive Damages at FSCIETI Dispute
Should Not Exceed $1 Billion, U.S. Says, BNA DAILY TA REP., Feb. 15, 2002, at G1
(noting a European Union request for $4.043 billion in punitive duties on U.S. im-
ports in response to January 14, 2002 WTO appellate body ruling upholding a
finding that the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000
continues to provide U.S. forms with subsidies for exports).
33 Peter Merril & Carol Dunahoo, 'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and Re-
ality, 72 TAX NOTES 221 (1996).
39 See generally Jeffrey E. Garten, Free Trade Has To Be Managed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2001, at A23 (discussing how globalization has linked national economies
and requires coordinated management).
40 See Elvia R. Arriola, Voices From the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the
"Maquiladoras," Latina Critical Legal Theory, and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 729, 762 (2000) (defining a maquiladora as a factory on Mexican soil
that assembles raw material components of foreign-owned enterprises).
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
tial tax exemption for income cannot be supported because they re-
sult in an unacceptable burden on U.S. and non-U.S. workers.
The proposal in this Article to eliminate U.S. tax on Africa-
source income is not likely to result in the abuse of workers de-
scribed above because it contains safeguards designed to protect
both U.S. and non-U.S. workers. No U.S. firm would benefit from
the proposed exemption unless a treaty containing protections for
African laborers became effective. The treaty would prescribe ap-
propriate working conditions, rates of pay, and other terms de-
signed to ensure that workers would be treated appropriately.
The conditions set forth in the treaty would, in turn, decrease
the likelihood that U.S. multinationals would move operations
abroad for low return investments made profitable only by the op-
portunity to abuse the human, natural, and other resources of the
host country. Despite these safeguards, it is possible that an ex-
emption system for income derived from African investments
nonetheless would result in a move of some U.S. production facili-
ties abroad. Although the capital export neutrality principle un-
derpinning the U.S. international tax system appears to support a
shift of production abroad for greater returns to capital, the toll on
U.S. workers should not be ignored. If job losses to U.S. workers
occur in enterprises in which returns to capital are greater in sub-
Saharan Africa, the plant relocations would serve efficiency goals.
Equitable concerns could be served by continued support of tax in-
centives for education and other training opportunities4' as well as
by appropriations for re-education of American workers.42
The third concern raised by the proposal described in this Arti-
cle is whether it actually benefits sub-Saharan Africa. The inten-
tion is to move African nations into positions of partnership with
the United States. The greatest benefits will result if African na-
tions are able to set appropriate terms and conditions for invest-
ment in their borders. These would include a tax rate that pro-
vides revenue necessary to finance public expenditures for
infrastructure, administration, and other public needs, or invest-
41 See Carrie Johnson, Report Calls for Work Force Education, WASH. POST, June
27, 2000, at E4 (noting that the 21st Century Workforce Commission, formed in
1998, has called for "partnerships between businesses and educators to solve the
labor shortage plaguing the technology industry").
42 The growth potential for U.S. labor appears to be in the services industries
(either high technology or low technology) and not in the manufacturing sector.
The most recent current account balance for the United States indicates a slight
trade surplus in the services sector. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 22, at 7.
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ment allowances and tax credits for given investments. Whether
treaty negotiations give rise to a system that provides reduced tax
rates or tax incentives (such as allowances or credits against tax li-
ability), this Article's proposal advances sub-Saharan nations to
positions as actors in the development of a tax system that will en-
courage and support investment gains.
The final concern addressed in this Article is whether the pro-
posed exemption system will cause the United States to violate in-
ternational taxation "norms." A group of industrialized nations
have recently advanced a campaign to eliminate what is termed
"harmful tax competition." The 1998 Organisation of Economic
Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") report, Hannfu Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, advocates elimination of tax
regimes which are viewed as unfairly competing for investment
dollars of multinational enterprises.43 The types of practices tar-
geted are those in which preferential tax regimes are established
for selected types of income.44 A list of harmful competition cul-
prits was published in the summer of 2000.
45
The exemption system proposed in this Article, calling for
elimination of U.S. tax on income from specified investments in
sub-Saharan African nations, may accommodate a regime of the
type condemned in the OECD report. Unless an African nation
devises a system that meets an exception crafted in the report for
OECD-member Ireland, which sanctions adoption of a low taxa-
tion rate of general application,46 a preferential regime would be
subject to attack and possible sanctions by the OECD.
43 ORGANISATION OF EcONOMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION 32 (1998).
44 Id. at 19-21.
45 See John Burgess, 35 Countries Named as Unfair Tax Havens, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2000, at E2. The thirty-five countries listed are Andorra, Anguilla, Anti-
gua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands,
Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey-Sark-Aldemey, Isle of
Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montser-
rat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St.
Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks and Caicos,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. In order to address the controversy re-
garding sanctions against these jurisdictions, the OECD established a global fo-
rum. Id.; see also Bob Goulder, OECD, Blacklisted Tax Havens Reach Landmark
Agreement, 90 TAX NOTES 297,297-98 (2001).
46 Meredith J. Coleman, Comment, The Republic of Ireland's Economic Boom:
Can the Emerald Isle Sustain Its Exponential Growth?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 833,
845 (2000) ("Ireland is a very attractive place for companies to start up. Why?
Two words: tax rates. Ireland's tax rate is among the lowest in all of Europe.").
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As developed below, this Article argues that the harmful tax
competition agenda should exclude sub-Saharan nations that em-
ploy tax strategies to attract investment from the industrialized
world. The OECD report, which currently applies only to financial
and passive investment-type income, should not be extended to
manufacturing and other active income, which are the types of in-
come most likely to be the subject of treaties with Africa.47 Consid-
ering the significant barriers to investment in Africa, it is difficult
to conceive of a case in which a preferential tax regime of an Afri-
can nation could harm the revenue-raising capacity of an industri-
alized nation. The industrialized world should resist dictating ap-
propriate tax regimes for Africa, particularly when no African
nation constructed or adopted the OECD proposals. Moreover, the
change in presidential administration in Washington, D.C. in early
2001 may signal a change in U.S. support of the OECD proposal.
Both Secretary of Treasury O'Neill and Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy Olsen have publicly questioned continued U.S. support of
these OECD initiatives. 48
The hegemony of the industrialized nations over establishment
of international tax norms should not foreclose a system of com-
promises implementing strategies for developing nations. For ex-
ample, from a tax policy standpoint, it is not clear why implemen-
tation of a limited preferential rate regime for targeted investments
coupled with very sophisticated information reporting and ex-
change among nations would not be an acceptable alternative for
the developing world.4 9 An example of such a compromise oc-
curred in the summer of 2000 when the members of the European
Union ("EU") negotiated a settlement of a dispute among members
47 Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 311, 316 n.33 (1999) (book review).
48 See Morris, infra note 144, at 2619. After the events of September 11, 2001,
Secretary O'Neill has supported cooperative efforts by the Financial Action Task
Force to combat terrorist financing. As a result, jurisdictions or financial institu-
tions offering special tax advantages to nonresidents are under heightened secu-
rity. Cordia Scott, Treasury Secretary Urges FATF to Set World Standard for Combat-
ing Terrorist Financing, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Oct. 30, 2001, available at LEXIS,
2001 WTD 210-1. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, signed into law by President
Bush as an anti-terrorism measure, strengthens the U.S. government's ability to
target money laundering and to monitor jurisdictions offering bank secrecy.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th
Cong. (2001) (enacted).
49 Brown, supra note 47, at 316-17.
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regarding minimum withholding tax obligations on payments of
interest and other investments from savings.50 Because several
members opposed the twenty-five percent withholding plan, the
EU accepted an alternate plan. Under that plan, those members
objecting to the minimum withholding rate were permitted to
avoid that obligation by agreeing to comprehensive information
exchange.51 With input by African constituents, international tax
norms that accommodate the developing world could be con-
structed.
3. EQUITY SUPPORTS MovE TO EXEMPTION SYSTEM FOR
INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The U.S. system of international taxation purports to be guided
by the principle of capital export neutrality, which dictates that the
taxation system remain neutral regarding the location of invest-
ments by U.S. firms.5 2 Neutrality is a surrogate for production effi-
ciency.53 If U.S. tax laws do not impact location decisions, firms
will locate investment to maximize returns. If production effi-
ciency is achieved worldwide, all firms will operate with the same
prices of input and output and require the same pre-tax rate of re-
tum.5 4
The U.S. tax regime adheres to the capital export neutrality
principle in several ways. It taxes the worldwide income of U.S.
firms and allows a credit for certain taxes paid to a foreign country
in which operations are located.55 Out of a concern for revenue
needs, the United States does not provide a refund to firms oper-
ating in a country with an effective tax rate higher than the one
prevailing in the United States.56 The maximum foreign tax credit
allowed a U.S. firm is equal to the U.S. effective tax rate multiplied
by income derived from foreign operations (net foreign source in-
50 EU Finance Ministers Agree on Savings Taxation, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, June
22, 2000, at 121, available at LEXIS 2000 WTD121-H.
51 Id.
52 TREASURY DEPT., DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONs: A POIuCY STUDY 26-7 (2000) [hereinafter TREASURY DEPT.
STUDY].
53 Joel Slemrod, supra note 30, at 6-7.
54 Id.
55 I.R.C. § 901(a) (1994).
56 I.R.C. § 904(a) (1994).
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
come).5 7 A firm does not benefit from a lower tax rate in a foreign
jurisdiction because there is a residual U.S. tax liability on the for-
eign source income after the credit.58 Accordingly, without a radi-
cal revision of current U.S. taxation, an exemption of the type pro-
posed in this Article would not provide any reduction of U.S. tax
liability.
A principal objection to the adoption of a system exempting in-
come from African sources is the departure from the efficiency
principle. There are, however, numerous current instances in
which the U.S. system rejects capital export neutrality. Firms may
defer tax on foreign income by operating through a foreign sub-
sidiary.59 With proper planning, in most cases, U.S. tax is never
imposed on the earnings of these foreign corporations unless it is
remitted or deemed remitted to the U.S. parent.60 Anti-abuse rules,
contained in subpart F of subchapter N of the Internal Revenue
Code, that deny deferral of tax on income of certain controlled for-
eign corporations are easily avoided by active businesses. The
rules permitting deferral of tax on the earnings of foreign subsidi-
aries are justified by a concern for competitiveness of U.S. multi-
national enterprises with foreign firms. 61 For the same reason, a
substantial amount of income from services performed abroad by
U.S. citizens and residents is exempted from U.S. tax.62
In addition, sophisticated planners may seize the opportunity
to shop for low-taxed income in order to inflate available foreign
tax credits. By combining high-taxed foreign source income with
lower taxed income from foreign sources, U.S. companies are able
57 Id.
58 For example, if a U.S. firm is taxed at a 12% rate on income derived abroad
($12 on income of $100), there is a residual U.S. tax liability on that income, which
remains after a credit is given against U.S. income tax liability for foreign taxes
paid. Assume that the U.S. rate is 35%. The U.S. tax liability on that income is
$35. After credit is given for $12 of foreign taxes paid, the U.S. firm owes $23 to
the U.S. Treasury. See I.R.C. § 904(a) (1994).
59 See I.R.C. §§ 881-82 (1994); Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436,
438-39 (1943) (discussing the doctrine of corporate entity, the multiple purposes
behind its use, and the necessary purpose required to maintain a corporation as a
separate taxable entity).
60 For foreign corporations, only the United States source income and income
from any sources that is effectively connected with the conduct of a United States
trade or business is subject to U.S. tax. I.R.C. §§ 881-82 (1994).
61 TREASURY DEPT. STUDY, supra note 52, at 55.
62 I.R.C. § 911 (1994).
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to maximize the amount of available foreign tax credit.63 This ma-
nipulation of the foreign tax credit rules arises, in some instances,
from the mere contractual designation of the place of sale of goods
as outside of the United States.64 In other instances, firms are able
to convert U.S. source income into foreign source income, inflating
the available foreign tax credit and effectively reducing U.S. tax on
domestic source income.
65
From the standpoint of efficiency analysis, these tax-savings
techniques are harmful because they allow firms to manipulate
U.S. tax rates based on the location, or ostensible location, of pro-
duction. The waste resulting from the location of investment off-
shore is created by the employment of capital in low-taxed invest-
ments that provide lower returns. Despite the departure from the
efficiency norm, however, these provisions have become accepted
features of the system and it is not likely that the U.S. system will
ever convert to one that is purely efficiency-based.
66
Offshore production and business dealings have been viewed
for some time as a legitimate avenue of U.S. tax relief. The interest
of the government in protecting its revenue base and the interests
of U.S. firms in combating the so-called anti-competitive features of
the tax system and in retaining flexibility to implement tax-
reducing planning strategies indicate that a worldwide efficiency
goal will continue to be superseded by national concerns. Yet,
cross border tax-minimizing schemes have provided vehicles for
sustained investment in the industrialized world and not the third
world.67 The U.S. system's departure from capital export neutral-
ity-based principles to create incentives for investment in sub-
Saharan Africa could move these nations to the role of partner and
player in the world economy.
There is ample support for a move to an exemption system in
the case of sub-Saharan nations. Concerning this region, a reliance
on principles of economic efficiency seems inappropriate and
6 See I.R.C. § 904(a) (1994).
64 See I.R.C. § 861(a)(6) (1994); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1167,1177 (1990) (deeming sales from a U.K. liquor producer to a U.S. dis-
tributor with immediate sales to U.S. customers as sales producing foreign source
income, which increased the distributor's foreign tax credit).
65 See I.R.C. §§ 114 (repealed 1990), 941-43 (repealed 1976).
66 Cf. Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 32, at 497 (noting that even those
who think that a deferral subsidy is appropriate should recognize that eliminating
it via legislation is not an unreasonable possibility).
67 See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text
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wrong. As noted above, per capita gross national product ranges
from $110 to $4,120 in these countries.68 For the period from 1984
to 1997, the percentage of the population living in poverty (under
one U.S. dollar per day) ranged from 11% in Tanzania to 88% in
Guinea-Bissau.69 Percentage of household income spent on food
for the period from 1991 to 1997 ranged from 43% in Djibouti to
75% in Mali. 70 Health expenditures, as a percentage of public ex-
penditure, were 1.2% for all of sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from
0.2% in Nigeria to 6.1% in Sdo Tom6 and Principe.7' Yet, the exter-
nal debt to GDP ratio in 1997 for many sub-Saharan nations ex-
ceeded one hundred percent.72
The illiteracy rate among persons fifteen years of age and older
was 41% (as a percentage of population) in all of sub-Saharan Af-
rica in 1998. 73 Life expectancies among the citizens of these nations
is the lowest in the world. In Sierra Leone, for example, average
life expectancy is thirty-seven years.74 Nearly 24,500,000 people in
sub-Saharan Africa, more than one in every ten adults, are infected
with the Human Immune Deficiency Virus, the virus that causes
AIDS.7s Malaria, AIDS, and other devastating diseases have deci-
mated the population and the drugs necessary to eradicate or treat
these illnesses, although readily available in the industrialized
world, are either not available or are not affordable. Civil war and
inter-nation strife plague a large number of African nations. Of the
forty-eight countries south of the Sahara, many are at war. As a re-
sult of these and other circumstances, U.S. gross direct investment
in sub-Saharan Africa dropped 43.2% from 1997 to 1998.76
These desperate circumstances of most of sub-Saharan Africa
call for intervention by the industrialized world. The United States
should respond by implementing the exemption system for sub-
68 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69 WORLD BANK, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT INDIcATORs 309 tbl. 13-2 (2001).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 318 tbl. 13-11.
72 Id. at 180 fig. 6-2.
73 Id. at 320 tbl. 13-13.
74 Id. at 313 tbl. 13-6.
75 Numbers to Bear in Mind in Sub-Saharan Africa, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2000, at
B3.
76 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 2-38. U.S. gross direct invest-
ment in sub-Saharan Africa dropped from $3.8 billion in 1998 to $2.2 billion in
1998. As a share of total U.S. foreign direct investment, direct investment in sub-
Saharan Africa declined from 3.3% in 1997 to 1.7% in 1998. Id.
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Saharan source income described in detail in the next section.
There is support for such a move under a theory of distributive
justice despite the divergence from the efficiency paradigm. As
Professors Bankman and Griffith have noted in their work on pro-
gressive taxation, "the concept of economic efficiency carries nor-
mative force only when tied to the welfare of individuals."
7
This Article's proposal shifts fictional U.S. tax revenue foregone
on income from investments in Africa-that is, the U.S. taxes that
might otherwise be collected on such income if no exemption were
enacted-to the ultimate benefit of sub-Saharan nations. The im-
mediate beneficiaries of the loss of fictional revenue by the U.S.
Treasury are domestic firms. Relief from tax will be enjoyed by
these firms if they make certain investments in Africa. The tax
break may shift resources from a sector either in the United States
or abroad, in which income from an activity is more highly taxed,
to activities in Africa generating income that will be taxed at pref-
erential rates if treaty terms are met. The intent of the proposal is
to generate, or, in some cases, increase, deployment of capital in
Africa by U.S. firms.
The foregoing of tax dollars in order to provide behavioral in-
centives is known as a "tax expenditure."78 While special scrutiny
has been accorded to tax expenditures by such highly-regarded tax
theorists as the late Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel, they remain
a feature of the U.S. tax system for both domestic and international
purposes.79 A theory of justice that supports an "expenditure" of
tax revenue in an effort to contribute to development and growth
in sub-Saharan Africa is appropriate and critical in view of the
needs of that continent.
In critiquing a now-repealed Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
provision with some similarities to the exemption system proposed
77 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905,1913 (1987).
78 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
79 Id. at 5-6. As the authors opine:
The classification of an item as a tax expenditure is purely informative,
just as the presence of an item in the direct budget of a government is in-
formative; it is simply a way of announcing that the item is not part of
the normative tax structure. This being so, it is appropriate to ask
whether the presence of those items in the tax system is desirable or un-
desirable, given the existing budget policy, tax policy, and other relevant
criteria.
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in this Article, Professors Surrey and McDaniel found it an ineffi-
cient mechanism for delivery of the desired benefits. They urged
either repeal of that Code section, the tax credit for business in-
come from Puerto Rico or other U.S. possessions in former Code
section 936, or restructuring to deliver the announced objectives.
Although the possessions credit and this Article's proposal are
similar because they provide some tax relief for business income
derived from a specified geographical source, they are dissimilar in
design. The possessions provision consists of a credit at the U.S.
corporate tax rate for a fictional tax that had not actually been paid
to Puerto Rico. Reports indicated that the goal of encouraging in-
vestment in Puerto Rico, particularly employment of Puerto Ri-
cans, was not achieved and that the huge benefits to the U.S. in-
vestors far exceeded any benefits to Puerto Rican employees.8 0
By contrast, the proposed exemption system for African source
income is tailored to result in delivery of the projected benefits to
sub-Saharan Africa. The participating African nations will collect
an actual, not fictional, tax on income from U.S. business opera-
tions that is imposed at a rate determined by treaty. The treaty ne-
gotiation process is designed to enable the African nation, pro-
spective recipient of the investment, to determine the proper
taxation level, wage and labor safeguards, environmental, and
other protections. If an exemption system for African income con-
stitutes a tax expenditure-a form of government spending em-
bedded in the tax code-the expenditure proposed is nonetheless
properly structured to achieve the desired ends.8'
Whether or not the proposal calls for a tax expenditure, a com-
bination of circumstances suggests that the United States must ad-
dress the economic crisis in Africa. As noted above, loan assistance
has failed to position African nations in the new economy. Many
of the loans will not and cannot be repaid. Conditions of debt re-
lief have been critiqued by some as tantamount to involuntary ser-
vitude. Financed projects, intended by the industrialized world to
ignite the local economy, have, in some instances, brought envi-
80 Id. at 160-61.
81 Before the tax expenditure label can be placed on a code provision, there
must be general agreement regarding the proper structure of the income tax.
Agreement as to whether a normative income tax would encompass an exemption
system is problematic. See Graetz, infra note 136, at 272-77; Michael J. Graetz &
Michael O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 45 Duke L.J.
1021,1102-03 (1997).
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ronmental and cultural devastation.82 It is apparent that the prac-sice of strategic direction of assistance has not promoted the de-
sired level of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, efforts to as-
sist Africa may be better directed toward the economicPartnerships that can be provided in the stimulation of investmentby U.S. firms. A shift of U.S. tax policy to a theoretical base that
acknowledges the value of distributive justice and reflects it in the
international tax system by adopting an exemption of tax for pre-scribed income from African sources would meet the need.John Rawls' second principle in his seminal book, A Theon of
Justice, maintains that "social and economic inequalities, for exam-
ple inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they resultin compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the
least advantaged members of society"83 According to Rawls, "A
conception of justice is a set of Principles for choosing between the
social arrangements which determine [the division of benefits pro-duced by society] and for underwriting a consensus as to the
proper distributive shares."84 Of the four institutions necessary to
sustain a just society, "the distribution branch is to preserve an ap-proximately just distribution of income and wealth over time by
affecting the background conditions of the market from period to
period."85 One job of the distribution branch is to adopt "a schemeof taxation for raising revenue to cover the costs of public goods, to
make transfer payments, and the like."86 Whatever choices are
made, the distribution branch is "to satisfy the principles of justicewith the smallest loss in efficiency"87 The allocation branch is to
identify and correct "by suitable taxes and subsidies and by
82 See, e.g., Chinedu Reginald Ezeta, International Law of Sebf-Determinationand the goni Question: Mirroring Africas Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 Loy. L.A. INrL
& Comp. L. Rev. 811 (1997) (explaining the harmful envroental consequences
of oil development and the destructive effect that oil production has had on Ogoni
culture); Wendy Irvine, Human Rights, Environmental Racism: The Nigerian Execu-
tions and the Case for the Ogoni, 4 CIRCLES BuFF. WOMEN'S J.L. & Soc. POL'y 66
(1996) (discussing oil development in Nigeria as harming the culture); Lacey, su-
pra note 20 (describing the impact of the construction of a dam on the culture, be-
liefs, and rituals of the Ugandan people); Onishi, supra note 20 (depicting the pov-erty and devastation in oil-rich Nigeria).83 JOHN RAWL , A THEORY OFJUsTicE 13 (rev. ed. 1999).84 John Rawls, Distributive Justice, in ECONOMIC JUSTicE 319 (Edmund S.Phelps ed., 1973).
8- Id. at349.
86 Id. at 349-50.
87 Id. at350.
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changes in the definition of property rights, the more obvious de-
partures from efficiency caused by the failure of prices to measure
accurately social benefits and costs."88
While Rawls maintains that distributive justice depends on the
institutions and the way in which they "allocate total income,
wages and other income plus transfers," he acknowledges that
"[slince the market is not suited to answer the claims of need, these
should be met by a separate arrangement."89 "[P]rinciples of jus-
tice are satisfied" if "total income of the least advantaged ... is
such as to maximize their long-run expectations." 90
Rawls' justice principle leads this writer to conclude that the
proposed exemption system for African source income must not be
rejected simply because it diverges from the efficiency goal. As de-
scribed above, the current international tax system departs from
the goal of worldwide efficiency in an effort to address other criti-
cal policy matters.91 The goal of encouraging economic growth and
development in sub-Saharan Africa holds tremendous significance
not only for residents of that continent, but also for the industrial-
ized world and for the new economy. The failure to tap the pro-
ductivity of the people and resources of Africa implicates growth
and development in the world outside that continent.92
88 RAWLs, supra note 83, at 244.
89 Id. at 244-45.
90 Id. at 245. In addition, Rawls' first principle must be followed, which is
"equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties" or, stated differently,
"equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity." Id. at 13, 245.
91 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
92 Advocating study of the potential beneficial effects on the rate of economic
growth, Professors Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave noted the im-
portance of increasing productivity of workers in low-income countries and found
that:
An important contribution to this can be made by redirecting capital
flows from high-income to low-income countries. As capital is redi-
rected, world output will increase, since capital should be more efficient
in countries where the capital-labor ratio is as yet very low. The suppli-
ers of capital in the high-income countries stand to gain as larger returns
are obtained from investment in low-income countries. There would,
however, result a redistribution of income from labor in high-income
countries (which would then operate with less capital) to labor in low-
income countries whose productivity would by increased by the rising
capital-labor ratio. An improved distribution of world income might
thus be obtained at the cost of increased inequality (though over a much
lesser range) in the developed countries.
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Given the social, political, and economic crises in sub-Saharan
Africa, any efficiency argument that would prevent the United
States from providing an incentive for investment in that geo-
graphical area by its firms must be dismantled. Initially, it would
be untenable to set up the economic efficiency goal, which is de-
signed to achieve worldwide equilibrium in the cost of capital, as
an obstacle to an exemption tax system designed to assist African
nations, which at this moment have little opportunity to influence
or participate in the world economy. Who would defend a choice
to sacrifice the possibility for progress in sub-Saharan Africa-
through increased investment and production-in allegiance to a
principle which only has meaning in the industrialized world? Con-
sidering the near absence of Africa in the global economy, a deci-
sion to reject the proposed exemption system in the name of
efficiency is a decision to continue the dominance of the industri-
alized world view in the global economy. The proposed exemp-
tion system invites the industrialized world, especially the United
States, to consider whether it can continue to adhere to economic
principles that ignore the special circumstances of sub-Saharan Af-
rica that render production efficiency maxims inapposite.
93
The overwhelming fiscal, social, and political needs of sub-
Saharan Africa furnish persuasive rationales for departing from the
business-as-usual capital export neutrality analysis that would re-
ject the adoption of an exemption system for African source in-
come in the U.S. taxation regime. Indeed, in the tax policy world,
the role of distribution of income across borders has been acknowl-
edged. Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave noted that
"[tihose considerations, humanitarian or political, that provide the
basis for concern with the domestic state of income distribution
cannot be limited to the confines of one's own nation."94 While the
Musgraves envisioned transfers among nations to encompass ei-
ther development aid or measures "similar in nature to a negative
income tax," the exemption system proposed in this Article raises a
third possibility.95
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTIcE 777 (4th ed. 1984).
93 While capital exporting countries regard the efficiency principle to be neu-
tral, in practice it is not neutral concerning developing countries because imper-
fect implementation of the policy, as in the United States, directs investment to
low-tax industrialized countries.
94 MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 92, at 774.
93 Id.
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This Article's advocacy of an exemption system for African
source income does not fit within the mainstream of U.S. interna-
tional tax policy. Recent commentators have called for strength-
ening of the controlled foreign corporation regime to further limit
the so-called "deferral privilege" (no taxation of income from for-
eign subsidiary until repatriation to the parent) for foreign subsidi-
aries, 96 for further curtailment of the deferral privilege (pass-
through taxation in most cases),97 and for taxation of multination-
als by the "demand jurisdiction," which is the country that con-
sumes the goods and services provided by the multinational.98
While others have questioned the primacy of capital export neu-
trality,99 only a few, including the community of multinational
businesses, have advocated wholesale deferral of taxation on for-
eign source income of U.S. foreign subsidiaries.100 Given the com-
pelling needs of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, and the con-
siderable barriers to investment in Africa notwithstanding the
prospect for adequate or even superior investment returns, this is
an opportune moment to consider total exemption of African
source income under prescribed circumstances. The next section
further details operation of an exemption system for African source
income.
4. EXEMPTION SYSTEM FOR PRESCRIBED INCOME FROM
INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The proposal in this Article for an exemption from tax for pre-
scribed income derived from sub-Saharan investments requires
negotiation of income tax treaties between the United States and
participating sub-Saharan nations. The plan contemplates that a
96 TREASURY DEPT. STUDY, supra note 52, at 48.
97 See Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 32, at 507-19; see also J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Tax-
ing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 299, 318-321 (2001) (considering whether
both fairness and efficiency concerns favor worldwide taxation rather than a de-
ferral regime that acts as an exemption system).
98 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1587 (2000).
99 Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 81, at 1104 ("The potential advantages of in-
troducing exemption elements for business taxation surely merit reexamination in
the United States today."); Hines, supra note 34, at 386.
100 NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (1999); Terrence R.
Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZ. L. REv. 835, 836
(2000).
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multilateral arrangement would best accommodate the exemption
system proposed. Establishment of a multilateral treaty will re-
quire a change in U.S. income tax treaty policy because the United
States is party to few income taxation treaties with more than one
partner.' 01 A multilateral treaty would offer the greatest advan-
tages to all parties. An arrangement covering a number of nations
would provide U.S. firms with broader access to resources in a di-
verse regional area. It would provide the United States with more
complete representation of the interests of sub-Saharan popula-
tions and sub-Saharan Africa with a stronger negotiating platform.
As there is currently only one income taxation treaty in effect be-
tween the United States and an African nation-the treaty with
South Africa -the multilateral agreement would add significantly
to the number of U.S. treaties with third world nations, a neglected
source of cooperative taxation arrangement.
10 2
The treaty would add four types of provisions not found in
current treaties: (1) a provision exempting from U.S. income taxa-
tion specified income from investments made by U.S. firms in the
geographical jurisdiction of signatory nations; (2) a provision speci-
fying the rate to be imposed on such income by the nation in which
the activity is located;103 (3) a provision identifying required labor
practices; and (4) a provision detailing minimum protections for
natural resources and other environmental conditions. It would
also contain a provision, found in all current income taxation trea-
ties, elaborating on information exchange, information reporting,
101 But see Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (Law.
Co-op 1999). The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act offers trade conces-
sions, including duty-free arrangements, in exchange for the Caribbean nations'
agreement to exchange tax information with the United States. Id.
102 The first treaty between the United States and South Africa became effec-
tive in 1948. That treaty was repealed by the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. 22
U.S.C. § 5001 (1986). The current treaty was negotiated after South Africa ended
its apartheid form of government, and was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1997.
Treaties currently in effect with third world countries include the treaties with
China, India, Mexico, Singapore, and Venezuela.
103 No U.S. double income taxation treaty provides an exemption from U.S.
tax for U.S. taxpayers or a connected provision setting the foreign rate upon
which the exemption is dependent United States treaties accord tax rate reduc-
tions: 1) on income subject to U. S. taxing jurisdiction and derived by residents of
the foreign country which is party to the treaty and 2) on income subject to the
foreign treaty partner's taxing jurisdiction and derived by U.S. residents or citi-
zens. In all U.S. income tax treaties a so-called "savings clause" reserves to the
United States the right to tax worldwide income of its citizens and residents.
UNITED STATES MODEL INcOME TAx CoNvENTiON art 1 4 (1996).
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
and other administrative matters; this provision would permit the
parties to avoid fraud, abuse, and other unanticipated manipula-
tion by potential beneficiaries under the treaty. The exemption
would provide an incentive for investment in sub-Saharan Africa
by eliminating any U.S. income tax derived from specified activi-
ties and by affording the developing nation an opportunity to at-
tract investment by determining the appropriate level of taxation
to be accorded production activity within its borders. Labor and
environmental protections would protect against any potential
"race to the bottom," in the form of rate shopping, caused by mul-
tinational firms seeking lower-taxed income. 10 4 They would also
protect U.S. and African workforces from the burdens that could
result from a shifting of an activity to a location in which exploita-
tive and abusive labor conditions and grossly inadequate wages
reduce production costs and correspondingly increase returns to
capital.105
Potential activities eligible for the exemption could include in-
come from natural resources exploration and development, manu-
facturing, sales and marketing, and related leasing and licensing,
and research and experimentation relating to development of tan-
gible and intangible property.106 The list of eligible activities
would be expanded or contracted on the basis of the interests of
governmental representatives negotiating the treaty. The presence
of more than one African nation at the bargaining table could be
expected to lead to discovery of synergism that would result from
the combination of countries rich in natural or other resources with
those offering a labor force either possessing skills ranging from
manual to managerial ability, or well-placed to benefit from train-
ing. Thus, for example, a U.S. firm might find it feasible to estab-
lish operations in two or more African nations with a plan to mine
a resource available in one country and to either refine or develop
the material in another through processes uncovered by research
and development activities in a third country.
Although most U.S. taxation treaties provide for tax rate re-
ductions on specified income, including interest, dividends, royal-
104 For an explanation of the "race to the bottom" theory, see Jule Roin, Com-
petition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J.
543,550-54 (2001).
105 See generally Merril & Dunahoo, supra note 38 (suggesting the same).
106 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 4-1-4-42 (detailing areas of
production in sub-Saharan Africa).
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ties, business profits, and capital gains, none provides for a rate re-
duction in conjunction with an exemption system because they
preserve the right of the United States to tax its citizens and resi-
dents on a worldwide basis.107 The rate-setting portion of the
treaty would reflect the determination reached by representatives
of the sub-Saharan governments of the amount of revenue neces-
sary to support local infrastructure. The rate selected should re-
flect the fiscal burdens expected to be imposed on the African na-
tion by the U.S. activity, which would include access to a robust
work force, utilities, roads and transportation, site development,
and communications and information dissemination networks.
The treaty would also specify labor standards and other work-
place protections for African workers. Included among these are
minimum wage provisions and protections against physical, emo-
tional, and sexual abuse, which will ensure that workers maintain
an adequate living standard and enjoy a safe and secure work en-
vironment. The appropriate wage level is a subject to be negoti-
ated by the treaty partners. The provision will ensure that workers
receive a wage at or above subsistence level for the region. This
feature of the treaty will preserve an appropriate standard of living
for African workers and will mitigate the flight of U.S. jobs off-
shore in search of cheaper labor. The inclusion of wage standards
and anti-abuse requirements is designed to eliminate the subsidy
of U.S. production at the expense of workers, which has arisen in
Mexican maquiladora sites, as well as in Caribbean and Asian loca-
tions.108
Success of the proposed exemption for African source income
would depend upon adoption of a sophisticated information
sharing and reporting network between the United States and par-
ticipating African nations. The proposal is intended to provide in-
centives for investment in African nations. It is not intended to
provide a device for circumventing U.S. taxation of income not le-
gitimately derived from specified activities in Africa. For example,
a tax-exemption for African source income could encourage U.S.
investors to shift deductible expenses to taxable activities, thereby
reducing income subject to taxation, and artificially shift income to
African locales where it will be taxed at lower rates. Artificial ma-
nipulation of income and deductions in order to minimize taxable
107 UNITED STATES MODEL INcOME TAX CONvENTION art. 1 4 (1996).
103 Arriola, supra note 40, at 729.
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income and to maximize the benefit of deductions would be pro-
hibited under the treaty. Provisions comparable to those contained
in the transfer pricing rules of section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code would form part of the treaty.109 In order to monitor activi-
ties eligible for the exemption, the treaty would require annual re-
porting by all signatories.
Establishment of a new set of source rules or modification of
the current rules would further deter the misuse of the proposed
exemption by investors seeking to avoid U.S. tax without a con-
comitant investment in the treaty-partnered African nations. Ad-
justment would be necessary in the current rules providing for the
source of sales income, for example, because they are susceptible to
abuse. Those rules generally provide that the source of sales in-
come is the locale where title to the goods passes.1 0 Judicial inter-
pretations of the rule have permitted sourcing of income in a loca-
tion in which title passes even if substantial economic factors
contributing to production arose elsewhere."' Application of these
rules to determine whether transactions are eligible for the exemp-
tion would invite manipulation and abuse by multinationals who
could obtain African-source income merely by designating passage
of title in a participating sub-Saharan nation. Accordingly, the
rules designed for sourcing income eligible for the exemption
would be most effective in deterring abuse if they were to adopt a
test that looks to the location in which factors of production are
significantly employed. A recent example of such a standard was
proposed in the Clinton administration's budgets for 1998 to 2000
concerning the source of property produced and sold partly within
and partly outside of the United States.112 The budget proposal,
which was never enacted, would have abandoned the current fifty-
fifty apportionment of the income to domestic and foreign sources.
109 See I.R.C. § 482 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (2001) (permitting the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to rearrange transactions between commonly controlled busi-
ness to properly reflect income and deductions); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8
(2001) (allocating and apportioning income and deductions to foreign source or
U.S. source income for purposes of determining the appropriate tax credit).
110 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (2001).
111 See A.P. Green Exp. Co. v. U.S., 284 F.2d 383, 388 (Cl. Ct. 1960) (holding
that title passes outside the United States). The last sentence of Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.861-7(c), which looks to the location of the substance of the sale to
determine source in the case of tax avoidance, normally does not change this re-
sult. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (2001) (looking to the location of the substance
of the sale to determine the source in the case of tax avoidance).
112 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-9, 66 Fed. Reg. 9138-02 (Feb. 6, 2001).
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The fifty-fifty rule automatically characterizes fifty percent of the
sales income as foreign source even in cases in which very minimal
foreign factors of production were involved. This results in artifi-
cial inflation of the amount of foreign source income derived by
the domestic corporation and an increase in foreign tax credit
limitation. As the foreign source income created by the fifty-fifty
rule is not likely to be subject to foreign tax, the increase in foreign
tax credit limitation allows the taxpayer to blend high taxed with
non-taxed income to maximize use of the foreign tax credit."13
The Clinton proposal looked to the source of economic activity
generating the income, an exercise targeted to result in less foreign
source income.114 While the provision was never enacted by Con-
gress, it furnishes a model for the type of source rule that would
discourage manipulation by multinationals seeking to gain the
benefits of exempt income without investment in sub-Saharan Af-
rica.
The exemption system implemented by the treaty would be in-
come-based and not entity-based. Thus, the exempted income
could be derived by any domestic or foreign entity or individual
(either a resident or a citizen) subject to taxation in the United
States on worldwide income." 5 In addition, distributions out of
earnings and profits arising out of eligible African-source activities
of domestic and foreign corporations would also be exempt from
U.S. taxation.116 Unlike the recently enacted provisions exempting
from U.S. taxation prescribed amounts of "extraterritorial income,"
which were declared an illegal export subsidy by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel in Geneva in July 2001 (a decision affirmed in
January 2002 by the appellate body), the proposed exemption sys-
113 The United States, in effect, cedes jurisdiction to tax income from domestic
sources under a place of economic activity test
114 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-9, 66 Fed. Reg. 9138-02 (Feb. 6, 2001). Loca-
tion of significant factors of production in Africa would exist if one or more of the
following was present there: workforce contributing substantially to production
of goods or services, tangible or intangible assets equal to twenty-five percent or
more of the fair market or book value of all assets employed in the activity, sub-
stantial management or administrative services.
115 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 941, 943 (2000) (excluding qualifying foreign trade in-
come derived by U.S. taxpayers and certain foreign corporations electing to be
taxed as domestic corporations).
116 This ensures that the specified income is excluded at both the shareholder
and corporate level.
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tern for African-source income does not offer a subsidy for export
of U.S. goods.117
In order to address revenue concerns, the exemption would
expire at the end of a ten- or fifteen-year period." 8 Congressional
study of the results under negotiated treaties could cause extension
or re-enactment of a similar provision.
5. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSAL TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The tax system of most sub-Saharan nations generally consists
of some combination of the following taxes: income taxes on indi-
viduals and corporations, property taxes, value-added taxes, and
import and export duties. Most of these nations offer some type of
investment incentive in the form of temporary rate reductions for
specified activities or new enterprises." 9 In the aftermath of civil
and inter-nation wars, many nations are certain to view foreign in-
vestment as a means to bolster declining government revenues.
The regime proposed in this Article furnishes a measured and lim-
ited means by which nations may structure a regime designed to
attract U.S. resources and to protect local interests.
117 See Chuck Gnaedinger & Robert Goulder, WFO Interim Report Finds U.S.
ETI Regime Violates Trade Rules, 23 TAx NOTES INT'L 7 (2001). The WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel's final report was issued in August 2001. This decision was fi-
nalized in January 2002, when the WTO appellate body affirmed the final report.
See Gale, Orszag & Sperling, supra note 36, at 1093; see also Raj Bhala,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1429 (2001) (noting in articles
XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII of the GATT the principle of non-reciprocity in
trade negotiations between developed and developing countries and the provi-
sion for developed countries to adopt special measures to promote expansion of
imports from developing countries).
118 To moderate revenue loss, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act includes a ten-year sunset provision that will cause the Act to expire
after 2010. 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (2001).
119 The following nations offer preferential tax regimes for specified invest-
ments either by administrative arrangement or by statute: Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, So-
malia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Awedhi Mushi, Tanzania
Considers Tax Holiday for New Investments, 20 TAx NOTES INT'L 2672, 2672 (2000)
(reporting that the Tanzanian government devised a measure to attract private
capital by offering a five-year tax holiday to all new investment projects involving
a specified amount of capital); Post-War Developments in the Liberian Tax System, 22
TAx NoTEs INT'L 2437, 2440 (2001) (stating that the President of Liberia has the
authority to waive taxes).
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Africa is an under-utilized destination for U.S. foreign invest-
ment. Of the largest 7,500 controlled foreign corporations report-
ing to the Internal Revenue Service for 1996, only eighty are incor-
porated in sub-Saharan Africa.120 Most foreign investment by U.S.
business occurs in Europe.' 2 ' While political instability and secu-
rity concerns in Africa furnish a partial explanation for the lack of
U.S. investment, it is apparent that U.S. taxation of the worldwide
income of domestic businesses operating abroad is a significant
impediment.
A system of worldwide taxation aims to remove an incentive to
shift activities to lower-tax jurisdictions in the hope of promoting
worldwide efficiency. This goal is purportedly achieved by taxa-
tion of all income from domestic and foreign sources at the U.S.
rate, allowing a credit against U.S. tax liability for foreign taxes
imposed at a rate up to the maximum effective U.S. rate 22 Yet the
tax literature indicates that lower rates nonetheless attract invest-
ment by U.S. businesses.' 3 U.S. businesses shop for lower tax
rates, without regard to production efficiency or maximization of
returns on capital, in order to either blend lower-taxed foreign
source income with higher-taxed foreign source income to maxi-
mize the available foreign tax credit or to defer higher U.S. taxes by
operating through a subsidiary organized in a foreign country with
low tax rates.
In these rate-shopping strategies, investment in Africa holds
little attraction. Income from sales of property exported to Africa
is deemed foreign source income under the rules outlined above,
and therefore eligible to increase the foreign tax credit limitation,
without regard to location of actual sales activity. Without a per-
manent establishment or other fixed investment in its geographical
120 Sarah E. Nutter, Controlled Foreign Corporations, in IRS, STATISrIcs OF
INCOME BULLETIN 152,153 tbl. 2, col. 2 (2001).
121 Id. at 152 tbl. 2, col. 6. Rate-shopping alone does not explain the concen-
tration of U.S. investment in Europe.
122 I.R.C. §§ 901(a), 904(a) (1994).
123 See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Firms Invest Heavily in Low-Tax Countries,
89 TAx NOTES 1349 (2000) (stating that U.S. corporations have made substantial
investments in low-tax countries like Ireland, Singapore, and Brazil); ROSANNE
ALTSHULER ET AL., HAS U.S. INVESTMENT ABROAD BECOME MORE SENSITIVE TO TAX
RATES? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6383, 1998) (finding
that taxes have a significant impact on the investment location decisions of U.S.
firms); Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations In-
vest?, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 825 (1999) (discussing the relevance of a tax structure to the
efficiency and return of capital for U.S. corporations).
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territory, the African nation generally will not tax such income.
Moreover, given the broad availability of low-tax jurisdictions
more traditionally viewed as offering economies or investment en-
vironments compatible with U.S. business goals, such as Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, and Ireland, there is no incentive to organize a
subsidiary in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, without the incentives of-
fered by a treaty of the type proposed, the prospect of deferral of
U.S. tax has not alone been sufficient to engender U.S. investment
activity.
An exemption system of the type proposed in this Article
would be compatible with traditional investment-attracting tech-
niques employed by many developing countries, including those
in sub-Saharan Africa. China, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
have viewed tax holidays, or a similar form of tax remission for
foreign investors, as a vital means of attracting development.124
While economists reject tax rate reduction as a long-term strategy,
a time-restricted reduction of tax rates to attract new investment
and to encourage development combined with reconstruction of
the entire tax system may provide a formula for economic recovery
for many sub-Saharan nations. 2 5
The final benefit of the proposed exemption system for African-
source income is the potential for development of a treaty network
between the United States and Africa. Apart from the income tax
treaties with South Africa and a handful of other nations and the
Caribbean basin exchange of tax information agreements,126 there
is a void in U.S. income tax treaty arrangements with the develop-
ing world. Considering the bilateral feature of most U.S. treaties,
the lack of developing country treaties is not surprising. 27 Indeed,
124 See generally Vo Ha Duyen, Vietnam Promoting Software Industry With 'Best
Investment Incentives Available,' 22 TAx NOTES INT'L 1138 (2001) (discussing the
Vietnamese tax holiday and the incentive structure); Lawrence Sussman & Chai
Lu, Another Call for the End of China's Tax Holidays?, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 2870 (2001)
(discussing China's use of targeted tax incentives in reaching state development
goals); How Teck Tan, Singapore's Tax Treaty Policy, 29 INTERTA 184 (2001) (ex-
amining Singapore's use of tax incentives).
125 See JAMES R. HINES, JR., "TAx SPARING" AND DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6728,
1998) (evaluating claim that "tax sparing" credits are ineffective in encouraging
investment in developing countries).
126 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127 See Victor Thuronyi, In Defense of International Tax Cooperation and a Multi-
lateral Tax Treaty, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 1291, 1295 (2001) (noting that a multilateral
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the most distinctive aspect of the U.S. income treaty is its unvary-
ing structure. For the most part, each treaty contains the same
provisions relating to persons covered, anti-abuse provisions de-
signed to prevent treaty-shopping by third parties, tax rate reduc-
tions, and source rules conceding primary tax jurisdiction. By its
formulaic content, each treaty succeeds in asserting the U.S. view
of the appropriate subject matter.
The hegemony of the U.S. treaty regime presently guarantees
that no accords will provide any incentives for investment in sub-
Saharan Africa. As described above, because the United States
does not relinquish its right to tax worldwide income of its domes-
tic multinationals and has not deviated from specified treaty-
contracting areas, from the standpoint of a developing nation, U.S.
treaties are unilateral mandates of the parameters of dialogue.128
Developing nations have been powerless to influence the treaty-
making process, as symbolized by the existence of only one U.S.
treaty with an African nation. 29 The treaty proposed in this Article
has the potential to upset this dynamic, by allowing African na-
tions to shape the foundations of the exemption system.
6. PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL
There is evidence that implementation of the proposal, com-
bined with reforms calculated to enhance the attractiveness of the
African locale-such as strengthened tax administration and
transparent tax laws in the short run and eventual infrastructure
improvements in the long run-would result in increased invest-
ment in Africa. Despite expected gains, there are two potential ob-
stacles to institution of the system: the reluctance of the United
States, as a policy matter, to accept tax sparing arrangements in
treaties and the current developed-world opposition to so-called
"tax competition."
A tax sparing arrangement is one in which a country agrees to
provide a credit against the domestic liability of its taxpayer for
treaty would encourage participation of a larger number of developing countries
in the global tax treaty network).
128 See Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 989
(2000) (opining that the consequence for developing countries that move from a
unilateral program to a treaty regime is the loss of tax revenues).
129 A number of developed countries have entered into treaties with African
nations. See Jeff Mukadi Hgoy, International Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa, TAX
Nomrs INT'L 275, 289-96 tbls. 1-8 (2001).
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fictional taxes (taxes payable if a special tax break were not in
place) paid to a foreign country. Tax sparing is similar to an ex-
emption system because it operates to eliminate tax owing to the
residence country (the country claiming a right to tax income of the
multinational on the basis of residence or nationality) of the multi-
national on income derived abroad in the host country (the country
in which activities generate the income). The fictional tax credit
exactly offsets taxes due to the residence country, but, because the
taxes are fictional as the result of a tax preference granted by the
host country, no tax is actually paid to the residence country.
The long-standing policy of the United States opposes tax
sparing arrangements in income tax treaties. 130 Senator Jesse
Helms, former long-standing chair of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, has strenuously resisted incorporating a tax
sparing arrangement in an income tax treaty.13' Tax sparing is re-
jected because it conflicts with capital export neutrality, the policy
foundation of the U.S. international tax system. 32 For sub-Saharan
Africa, however, there is no advantage to entering into a treaty
with the United States without the incorporation of the exemption
arrangement prescribed in this Article, which is akin to a tax spar-
ing provision. 33 Thus, current U.S. tax treaty policy does not ac-
commodate the types of arrangements the developing world
would prescribe to encourage investment.134
Recent reconsideration of the dominance of capital export neu-
trality supports revision of the United States' anti-tax sparing pol-
130 See Paul D. Reese, Comment, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Devel-
oping Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. REV. 369, 379 (noting that the
United States has not embraced the concept of tax sparing and that unlike many
industrial nations, it follows a strict policy of capital export neutrality).
131 Helms Urges Treaty With Brazil, 11 TAx NOTES INT'L 1114, 1114 (1995) (not-
ing letter from Senator Helms to Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin urging nego-
tiation of treaty with Brazil without a tax-sparing provision). The roadblock to tax
sparing created by Helms's stewardship presumably will be eliminated when he
retires from the Senate in 2003. Dan Balz, Dole To Take First Step in Bid for N.C.
Senate Seat, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at A2 (reporting Elizabeth Dole's first for-
mal step toward a bid for the Senate seat from North Carolina).
132 See Dagan, supra note 128, at 993-94.
133 See id. at 995.
134 In addition, recent efforts by a United Nations Committee to update its
Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries also fails to provide for investment incentives of the type sought by devel-
oping countries. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Devel-
oped and Developing Countries (Draft of 11 January 2001), WORLDWIDE TA DAILY,
June 15, 2001, available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 116-41.
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icy. As mentioned above, for various reasons, the United States
has departed from capital export neutrality principles to encourage
certain activities. 135 Moreover, U.S. multinationals have discovered
that certain provisions of the tax code may be manipulated to
achieve results akin to a tax exemption for some income from ac-
tivities abroad. Yet, the express and unintended exceptions from
the export neutrality doctrine have operated to support investment
in the developed world.
Lawyers, accountants, economists and legal scholars have be-
gun to re-examine the preference for export neutrality in the face of
the realities of the current hybrid system in the United States.
136 It
is not likely that the United States will find a basis for partnership
with developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa, if it does
not implement an exemption system to accommodate its need to
attract U.S. investment. Some movement toward recognition of the
need for investment incentives for the developing world was made
by Congressman Crane when he introduced the Economic Revi-
talization Tax Act of 2001, to re-introduce an exemption for most of
the income of foreign corporations engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.1
37
Adoption of the treaty exemption strategy recommended in this
Article would provide an important additional step toward pro-
viding support for development in sub-Saharan Africa.
An exemption system of the kind proposed in this Article is not
unprecedented. The repealed section 936 credit, still in force for
grandfathered companies, provided a partial exemption for in-
vestments in Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions. Originally
135 See supra note 132 and accompanying text
136 See supra notes 100-01. In discussing the issue of equitable international
taxation, Michael J. Graetz writes:
Achieving fairness in international income taxation is complicated fur-
ther by the question whether the use of the tax law to redistribute income
should stop at the nation's borders. Interrogation of this question, so far,
has been largely absent from the international income tax literature,
having generally been left to political philosophers. At a minimum,
questions of international redistribution introduce two concerns: first,
the issue of a worldwide entitlement to a minimal level of resources at
least to prevent starvation, and perhaps malnutrition; second, the ques-
tion of whether rich nations have any obligation to reduce misery to an
'acceptable' level worldwide.
Michael J. Graetz, Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Poli-
cies, 54 TAxL. REv. 261, 300 (2001).
137 Economic Revitalization Tax Act of 2001, H.R. 2550,107th Cong. (2001).
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conceived as a mechanism to enable U.S. firms to compete with
foreign firms in the Philippines, it became a device to foster eco-
nomic development in U.S. possessions generally.138 The provision
was repealed in 1996 in response to complaints that expected gains
to the local workforce were illusory.139
In addition, notwithstanding its adoption of rules in 1962 to tax
certain "tax haven" income of controlled foreign corporations,
Congress carved out an exception for corporate earnings invested
in projects in less developed countries. Until its repeal in 1975,
Code section 954(b)(1) preserved the traditional exemption of the
income of a foreign subsidiary from U.S. taxation for specified in-
come derived from these nations, which promoted qualified in-
vestments in poorer regions.140
Many industrialized nations opt for tax sparing provisions in
treaties with developing countries. Canada, France, Germany, It-
aly, Japan, and the U.K. enter into such arrangements with devel-
oping nations. 141
By implementing an exemption regime for African source in-
come, the U.S. gains the potential to support economic growth and
development in one of the poorest continents. By doing so, it
stands to lose revenue over a limited period of no more than fifteen
years.142 Unrelenting allegiance to a neutrality standard, which has
never been viewed as responsive to all economic issues raised by
138 U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., TAX POLICY: PUERTO RICAN ECONOMIC TRENDS (1997).
139 The General Accounting Office report showed, for example, that the share
of manufacturing employment in Puerto Rico declined from 22.4% of total nonag-
ricultural employment to 16.3%. Id. at 11. Most corporate beneficiaries of the sec-
tion 936 credit have been engaged in the manufacturing sector. Id. at 31. Puerto
Rico has responded by asking for an enhanced wage tax credit for new invest-
ments based on actual jobs created. Id. at 47. Between 1982 to 1996, the study pe-
riod covered by the report, "the share of domestic net income earned by Puerto
Rican residents from both property and employee compensation declined from
69.3% to 59.8% ... ," but residents' income in absolute dollars grew from $16.3 bil-
lion to $23.8 billion. Id. at 30.
140 I.R.C. §§ 954(b)(1) (repealed 1975), 955 (1962).
141 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX
SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 68-69 annex III (1998).
142 The exclusion for extraterritorial income in the provisions replacing the
former Foreign Sales Corporation regime, for example, is estimated to cost $25.6
billion in revenue over the five year period from 2001-2005. JT. COMM. ON TAX'N,
107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005,
16 tbl. 1 (Comm. Print 2001). The proposal in this Article can be expected to result
in a far smaller loss of revenue in view of its limited focus.
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cross border transactions, cannot justify the United States' failure
to address the needs of the developing world.
The second obstacle to implementation of the proposed ex-
emption for income from sub-Saharan African investments is the
developed world's opposition to so-called "tax competition." As
discussed above, this opposition culminated in publication of the
OECD's Harmful Tax Competition Report in 1998. Many com-
mentators have recognized, however, that, regarding developing
nations, the Report's conclusions about the harmful effects of tax
competition may be inapposite. Members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, developing nations, and others have disputed the
efficacy of the OECD proposal to take retaliatory actions against
low-tax jurisdictions.143
Critics of the report have noted the lack of developing world
input into the recommendations. Moreover, the report's specifica-
tion of the type of tax competition that is harmful negotiated an in-
discernible line drawn to protect the preferential regimes of OECD
members, some of the leading powers of the developed world, and
to condemn investment-attracting strategies of desperately poor
nonmembers. It is difficult to discern a significant difference be-
tween an investment-importing tactic of Ireland, which is one of
tax base broadening and drastic rate reduction, and an exemption
from taxation or rate reduction for foreign investment which might
be employed by an African nation. In both cases, the host nation
employs a tax rate reduction strategy to compete for investment
which might go to higher-tax industrialized nations.
In light of the considerable controversy surrounding its publi-
cation, the Harmful Tax Competition Report fails to enunciate gen-
erally accepted international tax norms.144 Consequently, it con-
143 See Cordia Scott, OECD Tax Haven Crackdown Is Out of Line, O'Neill Says,
91 TAx NoTES 1061, 1061 (2001) (noting that O'Neill is troubled by the promise
that low tax rates are suspect and that others should interfere with a country's tax
system); Cordia Scott & Andrion Howell, Congressional Black Caucus Says OECD
Tax Move Unfairly Blasts Developing Nations, 22 TAx NOTES INT'L 1600, 1600 (2001)
(observing that many of the high-tax competitors of the United States would like
to use the OECD attack on low-tax countries to undermine the comparative ad-
vantage of the United States); Paul Tadros, Barbados Given Three-Pronged Approach
to Removal from OECD Blacklist, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 2289, 2289 (stating briefly the
extensive discussions on the OECD's actions and appropriateness of listing Bar-
bados as having harmful tax practices) (2001).
144 See generally Brown, supra note 47, at 319 (noting that the Harmful Tax
Competition Report was prepared without input from developing nations);
Gilbert N.M.O. Morris, An Observer's Perspective-The Opportunities in America's
Rejection of the OECD Initiative, 22 TAx NOTES INT'L 2619 (2001) (applauding Secre-
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stitutes no barrier to adoption of the exemption system proposed
for investment income derived by U.S. taxpayers from sub-Saharan
Africa.
7. CONCLUSION
Much respect is accorded the United States in its position as
economic powerhouse and leader of the global economy. To be
sure, after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September
2001, its economic position has been challenged. Yet, some of the
instability in other parts of the world that has led to terrorism can
be attributed to the practice of the United States and the rest of the
developed world to underestimate the social and economic crisis
facing a large portion of the developing world.
The world faces a critical moment in which the needs of the
populations of poorer economies must be acknowledged. Many
are seeking solutions. Jubilee 2000, a consortium of religious and
public interest groups, has made a commitment to work toward
the elimination of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.145 The European
Union has begun to revisit the so-called "Tobin Tax," a tax on
cross-border financial transactions, as a means to achieve a similar
end.1 46 A group of fourteen industrialized nations has embraced
the "Third Way" movement, a coalition of progressive industrial-
ized and developing nations striving to "balance the forces of
capitalism with the ideals of social justice."147 The International
tary O'Neill's rejection of OECD initiatives and noting the opportunity for devel-
oping nations to influence cooperative tax agreements); Cordia Scott, Low-Tax Ju-
risdictions Press OECD to Answer Questions on Fairness, 22 TAX NoTES INT'L 2411
(2001) (noting the coalition of small and developing economies anxious to partici-
pate in consideration of cross-border tax issues); U.S. Treasury Secretary Statement
on OECD Tax Havens, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 2617 (2001) (noting both Secretary
O'Neill's questioning of the OECD's opposition to low tax rates and his recom-
mendation that OECD efforts be refocused on activities facilitating information
exchange).
145 Jubileesouth 2000, The Dakar Declaration for the Total and Unconditional Can-
cellation of African and Third World Debt, at http://www.jubileesouth.net/
documents/dakar2000/dakar2000_declaration.html (Dec. 14, 2000).
146 The Tobin Tax is a one percent tax on international financial transactions
used to fund development projects in poorer countries. It is named after James
Tobin, a Yale economics professor and Nobel Prize winner. See Highlight of French
Finance Minister to Push For Tobin Tax at ECOFIN Meeting, FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 28,
2001.
147 William Drozdiak, Summit Considers 'Third Way' to Solve Global Problems,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2000, at A24. The group includes Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
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Monetary Fund is working toward a program of debt relief for Af-
rica. 48 Yet, none of these measures alone, or in combination with
direct foreign aid, holds the promise to appreciably abate destitu-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa.
The current debate concerning the deployment of funds to
support anti-terrorism efforts or to rejuvenate the faltering U.S.
economy must include dedication of funds to alleviate the ex-
tremely disadvantaged population of sub-Saharan Africa. If, for
example, Somalia or some other African locale is considered a plat-
form for terrorist action,149 some consideration might be given to
alleviating the conditions in those countries that create criminals
dedicated to disrupting the status quo in the developed world. A
Congress considering allocation of resources for security measures
in Africa should consider implementation of the proposal made in
this Article. A balancing of the interests of the United States in en-
hanced security measures and a robust economy is short-sighted if
it does not include consideration of its long-term interests in de-
velopment and stability in the developing world.
Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal,
South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. Projects adopted by this group will
involve initiatives "to expand education in the developing world, [to] expose poor
populations to technology ... , and to fight infectious diseases." Id. It is not
known whether President Bush will continue to participate in this coalition. See
David E. Sanger, Bush Tells Blair He Doesn't Oppose New Europe Force, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 24,2001, at Al (stating that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair are
both searching for a "third way" in politics).
148 See WORLD BANK, supra note 6, at 250.
149 Alan Sipress & Peter Slevin, Powell Wary of Iraq Move; U.S. Eyes Somalia in
Continuing Al Qaeda Hunt, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al.
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